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I. Where is the Between of Human and Machine in Cyborg Life? 
Just as we can explore how humans and animals are “between” each other, as both being 
embodied in ways whereby they gain their sense of themselves through the surround and also as 
overlapping in their being comparably related to the surround1—a topic being pursued by many 
phenomenologists currently—so humans and machines increasingly criss-cross with each other 
in myriad instances within the surround. There are increasingly sophisticated developments in 
“embodied artificial intelligence” robots, for whom there is a continual feedback and response to 
aspects of the environment and to human actions. The “back and forth” with the surround creates 
a “between space” spanning robots and people or robots and aspects of the surround. However, 
for this paper I would like to consider what might be said to be a “doubly in-between” 
relatedness of humans and machines: human/machine cyborg beings. By looking at an extended 
example of a human implanted with computerized machinery, we will explore how their 
functioning together constitutes an “in-between space” of human and machine. Secondly, we will 
see how each evolves with the other in accomplishing new achievements for both, entering into 
an even deeper sense of the “in-between.” In this second sense of “in-between,” not only do 
human and machine share their functioning, but each becomes augmented in their capacities and 
possibly in their identities through the other.  
- 15 - 
Glen A. Mazis 
 
 
This second aspect of the “in-between” which focuses on the evolution in how machine 
and human come to work through one other allows us to see a temporal dimension of this cyborg 
being that is key to a larger point I would like to make in this paper: the “in-between,” although 
we tend to think of it in spatial metaphors, is actually radically temporal. The “phenomenal stuff” 
of “between-ness” is the work of both the unifying duration of time and the folding back upon 
itself of time. It is through time that beings become so interwoven that they exist in some way 
through each other, in an “in-between” kind of being. In “folding back” on itself, we will see that 
time is not just a duration of what would be otherwise successive moments. It is also the coming 
together of moments that were “distant” from each other in time until this instant of “folding 
back” conjoined them. However, this temporal folding back on itself comes about only through 
the phenomenon of embodiment. The “between” in this second sense emerges through the 
temporality of a perceptual unfolding and a restructuring of the relationship between the body, 
the surround and past events that gives rise to a re-constellation of the temporal thickness and 
unfolding space which might be called an “interplace,” to use Ed Casey’s terminology (Casey 
265). Analogously, this might more aptly be called an “intertime.” These interplaces/intertimes 
are themselves apt to become folded into each other, as time folds back into itself. The bringing 
into relation of what otherwise might have been temporally disparate is an ongoing and 
continually further intermeshing process.   
It happens that these two complementary but distinctive senses of the “in-between,” 
stemming from the duration of time and time’s chiasmatic nature,2 move us from a sense of the 
unity of “lived” time and space to the more radical enfolding of time within itself, a distinction 
that I believe corresponds to two senses of the cyborg which have been discussed by those 
interested in the human/machine in-between. The first and more traditional sense of “cyborg” is 




the case of organic beings who are physically and functionally united with mechanized beings to 
constitute what some consider “true” cyborgs. The second sense of “cyborg” claims that we have 
all become cyborgs in the sense of becoming enfolded within a world in which machines not 
only perform many of our key actions but also make possible how we know ourselves, express 
ourselves, modify our intentions, and open new avenues for who we might become. The issue of 
being a cyborg is not about implantation in bodies of machinery, for proximity of tools does not 
itself make them more than tools. Rather, what makes us become partly machine or cyborg is the 
way in which we are being put into question by machines, whether the machines have been 
implanted into our body or not, in such a way that we become transformed in who we are by our 
co-joint being. However, given the aim of this paper to return to a description of “the things 
themselves” by seeing this meaning emerging from a specific concrete example, I will keep these 
considerations brief. I will only provide a quick sketch of the issue of the temporally double “in-
between” and how it might make us all cyborgs, so that we might get to the phenomenological 
description of the case at hand, that of Michael Chorost’s four year experience with a cochlear 
implant, detailed in his book Rebuilt: How Becoming Part Computer Made Me More Human. 
In order to sketch out these two senses of the “in-between,” I would like to turn to 
Merleau-Ponty’s work for a moment, as the thinker who might well be called “the 
phenomenologist of the in-between,” and point to how time is at the heart of his related notions 
of “reversibility” and the “intertwining” of the “flesh of the world.” Reversibility is the sense 
within perception that as I am perceiving something; it is an inseparable part of my perception to 
have the apprehension of how I might be perceived by the object of my perception, as if it 
perceived me. This is a particular moment for Merleau-Ponty within the way I, as perceiver, am 
enfolded within the “flesh of the world.” In separating himself from the ontology that Sartre 
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articulates detailing the dualism of the cultural appropriation of the world, Merleau-Ponty uses as 
an emblem of reversibility how one’s hands touching each other become simultaneously the 
touching and the touched, which is a sharp departure from Sartre’s analysis of the discontinuous 
back and forth of each hand alternating as subject and then object of apprehension (Sartre 402). 
However, the overlapping articulated by Merleau-Ponty occurs within the duration of the 
unfolding of time. Taken as an isolated moment or a series of atomistic moments, the dualistic 
opposition stands. However, focusing on the ever increasing depth within time gives Merleau-
Ponty another perspective in which he notes that despite the shifting back and forth of subject 
and object:  
 … this is not a failure. For if these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away at 
the very moment they are about to rejoin, if there is always a “shift,” a “spread” between 
them, this does not prevent in time the metamorphosis of one experience into the other … 
spanned by the total being of my body” (The Visible and the Invisible 148).  
 
The sense that the hands are in some sense reversible, as are two speakers addressing each other, 
or the painter who confronts the tree he or she paints, occurs within a temporal process, and what 
might be distinct in an isolated moment in time, or in several such moments, comes to be blurred 
through the unity of lived time. We will see how this sense of inhabiting a lived space within the 
unfolding synthesis of time provides the in-between of machine and human to yield the first 
sense of cyborg.  
In another equally famous passage from The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
describes the sense of the flesh of the world found within a simple percept like a red dress by 
calling it a “straits gaping open” among an indeterminate set of beings and their relations. The 
red dress is:   
a punctuation in the field of red things, which includes the tiles of roof tops, the flags of 
gatekeepers and of the Revolution, certain terrains near Aix or in Madagascar, it is also a 




punctuation in the field of red garments, which includes, along with the dresses of 
women, robes of professors, bishops and advocate generals, and also in the field of 
adornments and that of uniforms. And its red literally is not the same as it appears in this 
constellation or in the other, as the pure essence of the Revolution of 1917 precipitates in 
it or that of the eternal feminine, or that of the public prosecutor, or that of the gypsies 
dressed like hussars who reigned twenty-five years ago over an inn on the Champs-
Elysées. A certain red is also a fossil drawn up from imaginary worlds (132).  
 
What has often been noted about this passage is how perception weaves together disparate 
aspects of the surround as well as differing modalities of apprehension such as memory, 
imagination, sensed qualities, proprioception, conception, et al., but what perhaps has not been 
focused on sufficiently is that the red dress example would indicate that each percept is also an 
interplay of temporalities: between now and the noted event of twenty-five years ago; among the 
hard red seen on roofs at a myriad of specific memorable times and just generally so; among the 
different times when the sight of differing reds may have been of the texture of the fuzzy, soft 
red of cloth that one’s clergyman wore each Sunday, as well as the times she wore that sweater 
during that lovely summer or the holidays when one’s aunt used that festive tablecloth; and the 
special weeks of vacation as a teenager when one saw the flakey red of the soil near Aix but also 
that six month period ten years ago when briefly living there; and the shiny red of silken borders 
of professorial robes when one was a student; of the red of all the tulips to come each spring or 
the fires that blaze in the dry areas in the decades to come as the water supply keeps dwindling; 
or the red of blood of casualties in Iraq echoing the blood of one’s comrades fallen decades ago 
in Viet Nam; and also between perceived reds during one’s life and the history of the world; and 
imaginal reds that have been brought to life at many other moments—the many different 
moments weaving together in the matrix of time.  
 This matrix of time of percepts is a rich “in-between” in which differing times do not just 
cohere in the self-unifying duration of time, but are the way within distinctive moments that 
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startling discontinuities are enfolded within time folding back on itself. This folding back on and 
within itself of what were widely disparate moments is what Merleau-Ponty means when he 
comes to see “time as chiasm” as having a depth in which it “leaps” gaps in order to be one flow. 
He indicates this aspect of time when he notes that “a point of time can be transmitted to the 
others without ‘continuity’ without ‘conservation’” (Visible 267). These flashings of time in 
which one moment comes to be joined with others “without continuity” suggests how moments 
of time become “piled up,” enjambed, as “sudden reversibilities.” The time of aspects of the “in-
between” may be more like a fractal constellation than that of a continuous “spanning” among 
moments. We may see that it is in this way, even though we may think we are not directly 
working with machines, that we might have become enfolded in distant mechanical processes 
that have restructured what our own histories have come to mean to us. We may have become 
cyborgs in becoming enfolded into a time where the history and future of the human has been 
reshaped by how machines bring new aspects of humanity into play. So, for example, when the 
machine determines that I have a genetic defect that will likely bring me and perhaps my 
children the same disease that my parents and grandparents had, their past becomes my past and 
an overwhelming present in a differing way, while also opening my future to a differing sense; 
my identity becomes fused with the time of the inauguration of the reading of genes and their 
significances brought about at a specific historical moment by varied machines. At the same 
time, a different reading by the machine indicating that I don’t have this gene would make my 
parents’ and grandparents’ past not my own in another way, and would open an alternate future 
whose particular new possibilities for thriving would be inseparable from the machine’s moment 
of intervention in my life. In this alternate scenario, my sense of my own time would fuse with 
its specific history wherein we were able to achieve this result and free humans from this worry. 




To see both the unfolding duration of time as opening the in-between of humans and 
machines in “cyborg life,” as well as time folding back on itself to join what were disparate times 
in another sort of in-between, we can turn to and explore the richly detailed account of Michael 
Chorost’s extended experience with his cochlear implant. Michael Chorost describes in detail his 
experience of being suddenly thrust into a new mode of existence that he could only understand 
as a wrenching transformation into being a cyborg. Chorost was thirty-six years old and a recent 
PhD graduate in educational computing, when suddenly he went from being able to hear fairly 
well with hearing aids, to becoming totally deaf. He was offered the chance to hear again by 
having a cochlear implant put in his skull. 3  His experience can furnish us with a 
phenomenological description of what it is like to become transformed into a cyborg. We will 
see that Chorost’s understanding of what this means shifts from an initial fear of having to live 
with a machine molding his sense of the world, to four years later seeing that his being as a 
person had shifted through the means of the machine into possibilities that were lying unrealized 
in his past.   
            At the beginning of his book, Chorost makes it clear that he is disconcerted by the loose 
way in which the term cyborg is being used. For example, he notes that “cultural theorists often 
claim in this day and age, everyone is a cyborg—that technological society has worked its will 
on all of us” (41). It is understandable, given his ordeal of having computer-driven machinery 
placed into his sensory system, that he does not want to dilute the forcefulness of the idea of 
being a cyborg to include everyone. In his definition, “[t]he essence of cyborgness is the 
presence of software that makes if-then-else decisions and acts on the body to carry them out” 
(40). Chorost’s point is that some people’s bodily functioning and experience will be dictated by 
a machine. He disputes that having silicon chips implanted in one’s body in order to enhance its 
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capabilities or to allow one to do what other humans normally do is to become a cyborg: “… 
cyborgs are physically fused with equipment” and have no choice but to live through the 
computer’s programming, or else sacrifice vital functions.  
However, by the end of the four years of living with his implant, Chorost is less adamant 
about the physical fusion of technology and flesh as being the definitive essence of cyborgs, nor 
does he feel that different from others. Rather than dictating his reality, the cochlear implant 
altered his reality in ways that called for him to change to meet these challenges, and these 
changes were not physical, but rather concerned his ways of being-in-the-world. Instead of 
feeling isolated from the norm, he realizes that most of us are cyborgs in the way technology has 
altered who we are and how we exist. Our ways of being-in-the-world have shifted and are 
shifting continuously in a dialogue with machines in our surround. He also sees a positive power 
in being a cyborg insofar as we are displaced from an objective world of set realities to a shifting 
one that gives us choices of ways to be. Cyborgs, for Chorost, and I agree with him, are beings 
who have become changed in who they are in some way which is not merely optional anymore. 
In other words, silicon chip implants that do not change one’s relationship with the world or 
others, or that merely enhance an ability, do not make one a cyborg. To be a cyborg is to 
experience a transformation of one’s sense of existence in such a way that one cannot be fully 
human or fully oneself outside of the link with certain machines. However, notice that this link 
does not require literal physical fusion. The key shift is on the level of the basic ways we form 
relationships with the world around us such that these relationships change who we are. 
Initially, Chorost realizes that his hearing loss is not just a sensory deficit, but is more 
deeply about the body’s power to “be-in-a-world,” to be enmeshed with the things about one: 
“… the sense of hearing immerses you in the world as no other … Hearing constitutes your sense 




of being of the world, in the thick of it. To see is to observe, but to hear is to be enveloped” (9). 
Hearing, perhaps even more acutely, and yet also like the rest of perception, is not about 
registering the world distantly, but “plunging into it”—being incorporated into it. Chorost 
realized that in some very real sense the world would be different for him: “The world mediated 
by the computer in my skull would sound synthetic, the product of approximations, 
interpolations, compromises” (9). There is a sense in which we are machines, biological 
machines, and the world is a result of that operation we consider “normal”—of how sound waves 
are translated into phenomena that are heard by us as a result of the workings of our common 
biological machinery. It is because of this kinship of the body with what we consider to be purely 
“mechanical” machines (which we misguidedly regard as utterly foreign) that the “in-between” 
of body and machine unfolds. However, the sense of kinship between body and machine would 
not be seen by Chorost until he had gone through a long process of discovery. At this initial 
point, the foreignness of the machine meant to him that as a cyborg his world would be altered 
by a foreign power. This was Chorost’s fear before the implantation, and it is also his experience 
afterwards. Sometimes, the feeling was more acute than at other times: “I could hear clocks 
ticking across a room, but I did not feel like a hearing person. Hah! I was the receptor of a flood 
of data” (73). Embodiment allows us to be what we are hearing, and not take it in at a distance as 
data. So, at first, the implant/machine disrupted Chorost’s embodiment. However, embodiment is 
a process, a matter of time and evolving relationships with the world. Chorost knew this before 
the implantation when projecting this cyborg body: “My body would have bewildering new 
properties and new rules, and it would take me weeks, months, even years, to understand them 
fully” (9). His chronicle is testimony to how embodiment changes in relationship to the world 
around it. Like the two hands coming to blur in their boundaries, a cyborg being depends upon 
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this temporal unfolding within the ongoing unification of time to create the “in-betweenness” of 
human and machine.  
This power to shift us away from a past norm seems at first to be a destructive aspect of 
the machine that tears us away from the “natural” human and animal life. Both the world has 
been altered through computer mediation and the body has been altered by having a different 
sense of the world, and it may seem like “damage.” For anyone in this position, the 
overwhelming sense may be that they are prevented from “going back” to some previous sense 
of hearing taken to be the norm. Now, their only choice is to keep moving on to a new sense of 
hearing—one that emerges from a new world and a new body. In some way, Chorost found 
himself with a new kind of hearing, one that was hard to translate into what he had experienced 
before with his hearing aids. He had to give up on the sense that there was one way to be in the 
world, one way to experience the world, for his hearing through the implant would be different: 
“It would not be hearing. It would be the equivalent of hearing to hearing” (79). As he realizes 
this, Chorost says “goodbye” to reality, for he assumes, as most of us have been taught, that there 
is one reality to which we all aspire with objectivity to reveal and impact.  
From this perspective, he could only assent to the idea that “I learned that my hearing had 
not been restored. It has been replaced with an entirely new system that had entirely new rules” 
(81). What Chorost gradually realizes, however, is that what at first seemed to him to be a purely 
“artificial” creation of the machine’s power to change the flow of his existence was just another 
deviation from some sort of expected flow that had merged as the norm of the interweaving of 
the natural and cultural worlds. In some sense we are always deviating from past givens in the 
power of transformation that opened for us the initial flow phenomenon that we felt was 
“natural.” Whether this be found in the baby moving from a myriad of sounds and tones to be 




“talked into” language by parents and others and thereby coming to inhabit an entirely different 
auditory world, or in later openings of new sense such as learning about bird calls and suddenly 
hearing the birds’ summons to one another, we always inhabit the sensory worlds of embodiment 
by “re-inhabiting” them continually. This is at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s declaration that each 
moment of perception “is a birth and is a death” (Phenomenology 216). The machine 
intervention here may help us to see how our embodiment and our sense of meaning is always a 
temporal transformation of what might otherwise be inert and continuous into an unfolding “in-
between” that is a matrix of new possibilities. 
While bodies may have been seen as stable structures until this past century, it is now 
common sense to realize that the physical body is a process whose cells are continuously 
replacing themselves in ongoing intervals. The physical body is a flow phenomenon. It is now 
widely known that even the brain is capable of remapping itself by weighting inputs differently 
through its networks of neural connections; we know that it can reorganize its structure over the 
longer term by growing new connections between neurons, in what is termed the brain’s so-
called “neural plasticity.” This was a discovery that soon came home to Chorost: “Thanks to 
neural plasticity, the neurons in my auditory cortex were slowly reorganizing themselves to 
handle the bewildering new input from the implant” (88). Disturbing sounds and aberrations 
changed in their significance or disappeared because, as Chorost relates, “over the weeks and 
months my auditory cortex obediently refined its topography, making physical distinctions where 
none had existed before. The implant was literally reprogramming me.” The phenomenon of 
Chorost’s hearing is an “in-between” of human and machine, and the sense of each was 
transforming, too. This is the first or traditional sense of cyborg, the modification that takes place 
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in the interaction between embodiment and machine as an ongoing improvisatory duration where 
the contribution of each is “worked over” by the other. 
For this essay, it is important to note that when the computer, the machine, is intimately 
joined with the human body, it is in dialogue with the physical makeup of that body and its 
neural network. The neural network’s plasticity adapts to what is around it through feedback 
loops that incorporate new pathways. Insofar as our own body has a mechanical dimension, it is 
one that adapts, that comes to meet the world around it or inside it to attempt to find a way to 
thrive and to make sense of experience. If the autonomic, the organic and the visceral comprise 
that biological dimension of our existence that is seen as its mechanical dimension, then the 
mechanical has been miscast as the purely invariant, the unresponsive, and the unrelated. Even 
the more mechanistic parts of ourselves, like our neural functioning, are temporal phenomena 
that are open to relational dynamisms; their unfolding in time changes what they are and what 
future unfoldings are possible, such that new aspects of the surround become integrated into 
them, and their being is between themselves and other beings through their relation within the 
surround. In the traditional sense of cyborg, there is a way in which we have always been part 
machine, biologically, but only if we also come to rework our idea of machine from simple 
invariant levers and pulleys to feedback structurings in a dynamic field of constant 
transformation of all parts by all the parts to which they are related. Cyborg being does not 
indicate that part of human being is rigidified and inert, but rather that there are additional 
articulations of our capacities that are dynamically related to both the materially shifting 
surround and its varying senses altered by our evolving existential being-in-the-world.4 
 
 




II. The Existential Between of Humans and Machines as Cyborgs 
However, beyond the physical adaptation of the body to the direct input from the 
machine are more existential shifts that are required of Michael Chorost in order for the implant 
to facilitate full functioning in the world. Through his experience, we see that the existential and 
the physical are not separable; both are aspects of embodiment. Chorost is startled when one day 
he realizes that his way of being concerned about other humans must change in order for the 
machine to be able to function as mediation with the world. Merleau-Ponty documents how 
perception works to give us a maximal sense of the world only when the person perceiving is 
invigorated by the “perceptual faith” of our sensory being. This “faith” is comprised by our 
openness to the richness of our experience and our plunging into its vitality in order to hearken to 
what calls us from all corners of the world to be experienced by us. Perception begins with the 
immediate sense that there is further meaning to be discovered by allowing the flow of the 
unfolding of one’s perceptions to capture one’s attentiveness. Attention is the response to a 
beckoning, but this beckoning can only have efficacy if one has the faith that there is more here 
to be discovered. This faith is an implicit commitment to work through what can come to be 
understood through the unfolding perception. When we “pay attention,” we are not throwing an 
inert, indifferent “searchlight” onto the scene about us. We are actively looking at something that 
promises to mean something for us. If we are more attentive, more expectant, and more engaged 
in finding whatever as yet muddled sense it has first presented to us, it will yield more meaning 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 214). This attentiveness develops into a “positive” feedback 
loop. In some way, whatever we perceive “beckons” to us and is an invitation to enter a dialogue 
with the promise of further meaning. However, it can only become such an invitation if we 
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sensitively meet it and enter into the depth of its sense, and thereby allow a true encounter to 
occur. 
At one point in Chorost’s attempt to adjust to his cochlear implant, overwhelmed by 
frustration, he avoided speaking on the phone, especially with his mother, because he could not 
bear to want to hear and to not be able to hear. As he started to have positive experiences with 
his new implant, Chorost made the call to his mother with a new attitude—believing there was 
something for him to hear. To his amazement, he realized that he understood her, that he heard 
her. He was struck at that moment by an insight:  
And yet I was understanding her. Believing that I could do it seemed to be half the battle. 
That let me extend myself into the sound and let it sink into me. If I didn’t believe I could 
do it, I became a wall rather than a sponge: the sound bounced off me without penetrating. 
It was like the difference between looking blankly at an object and seeing the object (99-
100). 
 
On an immediate level, Chorost had started to change his relationship to the auditory world. He 
was leaning into it now with the expectation beginning to dawn that it would open for him in a 
meaningful way. He started to believe in its sense for him, as an effulgence of significance that 
could be garnered.  
Once we are oriented, both on the level of our immediate hearkening in an emotional 
attunement to the perception of things and consciously turned towards them, then we are able to 
swim into the sense of their presence. Allowed to plunge into the depths of perception, to be 
engaged and attentive, to become attuned, the world sings to us in a different way or shines or 
touches us. Here, we see how a practical space within his surround, the space of telephone 
conversations with those he cares about, opened up for Chorost as an in-between space between 
his own ability to hearken and the cochlear implant’s facility at translating and transmitting to 
him the sounds of their voices. Now the past frustration and isolation are transformed in this 




temporal unfolding, bringing together his new faith and attentiveness with these upcoming 
opportunities in order to cast new future horizons for him. However, we see in following 
Chorost’s description that two more dimensions to this openness are needed in order to allow the 
interweaving of embodiment, machine, and world that will allow his perceptual possibilities to 
be achieved. 
Actually, although I have framed it this way for clarity of presentation, believing in his 
ability to work with his hearing to add sense to his life was not Chorost’s first breakthrough. I 
have presented it this way, because the belief in the richness of what is perceivable is perhaps the 
initial prerequisite to opening up the deeper significance of the perceptual world. But there is 
also a particular kind of spontaneity required of perception for its full sense to emerge. A level of 
experience can occur spontaneously in the midst of our alienated struggles in some situations. 
Earlier, in the months after the implant had been installed, Chorost struggled to make sense of 
the garbled sound he was experiencing. Yet, one day, on the way to work, he was taken off guard 
by a sudden ability to hear and make sense of his car radio. At first, trying to hear what was 
being broadcast, Chorost was frustrated by hearing only “pseudo-English,” something that 
sounded like English, but only came to him as very reasonable sounding nonsense. However, as 
his attention drifted off to concentrating on driving and thinking about the Halloween costume 
that he was going to get, he realized that parts of the radio broadcast were being heard and 
understood by him perfectly. When he was surprised to realize this and tried to listen to the radio 
again, it again sounded like nonsense. He was puzzled, but realized that he hadn’t really been 
paying attention to the radio—and that’s when he suddenly heard it. He allowed his attention to 
wander back to being absorbed in the road and driving, and to thinking about his costume. Sure 
enough, the radio started to resolve into understandable bits again! 
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So, as Chorost thinks about it, the answer is one that does not fit the dominant Western 
“yes” or “no,” one or zero, binary logic. The key to really hearing was that Chorost “had to pay 
attention. Just not too much attention” (90). He tested this out further and found that indeed the 
radio drifted in and out of focus as he “played with different levels of attention” (90). He thought 
of it using the apt analogy of finding “the sweet spot” on a tennis racket, which like listening 
requires some sort of attunement, being in a flow with things around one, but not willing, not 
trying forcefully, just being alert in an unfocused way. As Chorost says, it’s hard not to try to 
explicitly focus, and then refrain from forcing it once it starts resolving, but to force it only 
destroys the attunement and perception. Chorost concludes, “You have to be calm, open, relaxed 
alert. Poised at exactly the right mental place between idleness and tension” (91). This 
description fits the lived sense of the sort of embodied understanding that is attuned to its 
surround, that is enmeshed in it, but on a prereflective level. Merleau-Ponty describes how as the 
body attunes itself to the environment as a whole, it takes in the sense of the surround in a way in 
which items form a constellation or a gestalt, an overall organization, which draws upon our felt 
and habitual relationships. There is no need for a deliberative, reflectively directed focus for this 
sort of “lived” or “embodied” understanding. Actually, it dissipates as we turn our reflective 
focus upon it or will ourselves to the same sort of relationship.  
In addition to being attuned to what is around one beckoning to be perceived, and being 
drawn towards deepening its sense, there is another dimension to this kind of openness. The 
upsurge of the sense of the world in perception has to be allowed by a kind of “giving oneself 
over to the world” or what Heidegger might call a “letting be” [Gelassenheit]. The world often 
reveals its sense if it is hearkened to by allowing it to flow out to meet us rather than wrestling it 
into our grasp. We have to let our attention be captured, not willed. We have to be open to the 




world as a partner in dialogue that has to be given the space to form. This “interspace” or 
between space forms as allowing a flow to form, as opening to a possible dialogue, as a process 
which needs time to unfold and invite us into its temporal expanse or emerging “intertime.” 
Merleau-Ponty makes the analogy between attuned perception and sleep, where we have to let it 
happen, to “come over us,” for if we try to will sleep, it will not happen (Phenomenology 163). 
Similarly, with the fullness of perception and its relational understanding with the qualities of 
things, one has to let go into the perception. This letting go is an art that can be learned. 
This “letting be” of the surround is not only a matter of modifying the will or ego or of 
immersing ourselves in a certain kind of attention, but in addition, it concerns the emotional 
relationship to what we might understand is vital. The space within which we are interwoven is 
not just a set of factual occurrences or indifferent objects. This space is criss-crossed with vectors 
of sense about which we have feelings. Part of our connection to this space through embodiment 
is affective. For example, someone may be anxious about being in a part of town because there 
has been a series of crimes in this locale lately, or is fond of this neighbor and therefore is apt to 
pay more attention to him than to someone else who lives next door on the other side, or feels 
comforted in this chair at the end of the day since it offers rest and has associations of many 
books read in its confines, or feels afraid of the set of eyes glowing in the forest on this person’s 
nightly walk, and these feelings change the person’s access to these things. Feelings alter the 
orientation towards phenomena and the felt connection with them makes us able to know them in 
different ways. So, in the examples just described, one might suddenly see shortcuts in the streets 
in the threatening neighborhood or notice ways one might be able to help the neighbor one cares 
about or notice that the beloved chair needs some minor repair. One apprehends what one might 
otherwise miss, if it weren’t for the emotional pulls that one experiences. Merleau-Ponty gives a 
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striking example of being in the south of France during the war and being utterly immersed in 
the village life, until he hears that Paris has been bombed. Then his worry orients him utterly to 
Paris, and he feels disconnected from where he literally is located. The small details of village 
rhythms and surroundings that had fascinated him become inapprehensible as he is riveted to 
Paris by his worry (Phenomenology 285). Fear makes some objects heightened and makes us 
closed off to others, just as love makes us able to perceive some aspects of another person that 
had been hidden, but perhaps not able to see others. In indifference, however, much of our 
perceptual, affective lived understanding glides by in the background unexperienced by us.  
Things are not all felt to the same degree, so they do not register with us to the same 
degree, and are not the focus of our directedness, connectedness and ability to explore them to 
the same degree (Mazis, Emotion 69-89). Emotional orientation to something or someone is the 
“glue” between the person and the surround as one becomes immersed through feeling in an 
affective space. Therefore, it is not surprising to see in the case of cyborgs that emotional 
openness is part of the indirect way that machines are joined with humans to gain access to parts 
of the surround. Chorost comes to realize this during the four years of adjusting to his implant. It 
is a discovery that he had made earlier with his hearing aids. During a group therapy meeting in 
the late 1990’s, the radio transmitter that had previously broadcast to Chorost’s hearing aid in 
order to help him hear the members of the group went dead. To his surprise, unlike other times 
when his batteries did not function, he could still hear people on the other side of the room. He 
realized that through the therapeutic process, he had overcome his emotional isolation and had 
begun to feel an emotional kinship with these people and their problems. As a result, as Chorost 
puts it, “What had changed, I suddenly realized, was my ability to listen. Not to hear, but to 
listen” (78). As he meditated on this, he realized that if he could become a more caring person, 




concerned about what others were saying and able to feel his connectedness to them, he could 
hear them better. In his dialogue with the cochlear implant, Chorost is being urged to go further 
in his transformation to a more emotionally open and caring person.  
He recalls this lesson from his past as he is struggling with his implant and realizes that in 
order to become able to hear with the potential that the machine has provided him, “I would have 
to become emotionally open to what I heard” (78). The machine certainly helps to create his 
context, both internally and inescapably, as allowing him to be woven into what is going on 
around him in an auditory way. Yet for the machine to work, it needs him to develop a closer 
relational bond to people and events around him. He must weave an existential context into 
which the machine can insert itself. If this example holds, then for humans to experience the way 
machines can open parts of our world and become more akin to us will require an emotional 
relatedness to things of which they can be a part. We think of machines as functioning through 
indifference, but insofar as a partnership forms, a possible overlap of human and machine, it 
requires a care from the person towards that in the world which is to be better revealed and 
understood. For the machine’s function to be realized, it may call upon us to realize more of our 
potential as social beings. 
This “in-between space” is a richer one that requires all those moments, even if they are 
widely distributed, somehow to come to reverberate together, like the widely scattered moments 
of differing reds, to give a cogent sense of care and openness, into which the machine can be 
creatively interwoven to augment our initial human capacities in cyborg being. Our potential 
does not lie like a neat path behind us. It is scattered in moments of discovery and openness, and 
then lost again at other moments and stretches of time to other ways of being, and within other 
less congenial contexts of our lives. Chorost is able to pull together repressed and scattered 
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dimensions and moments of his being to become a more caring, open and responsive person who 
then can utilize the cochlear implant in a more powerful way to communicate with others, a way 
that allows the machine also to gain a greater level of efficacy. This level of temporal bringing 
together of our disparate parts and allowing machines to augment our humanity takes a deeper 
entry into time than merely letting its syntheses occur through learning how to attune oneself to 
the co-joint working of human/machine. It is this aspect of intermeshment that I have called the 
second sense of “in-between” throughout this essay. It is rather more like the moment when 
Melville’s character, Ishmael, exhorts himself to “take a deep dive” into the depths of the world 
and psyche that had been lost and scattered to him in the “drizzly November of his soul” 
(Melville 23, 26), but which can be recovered. So, for Chorost, these moments of increasing 
engagement become folded back into earlier breakthroughs, reinforcing them all. As he became 
more open with women that he was dating, for example, or with friends, these moments opened 
up in an immediate or “lived” way to the earlier moments of dawning openness, like those with 
his therapy group years before. The between in this sense emerges from among varied times that 
twist about each other and combine in their sense becoming a new “fuller” present and yet not—
as the past times still retain a sense of their old disparateness that has suddenly become 
reconfigured. These moments were not successive but at odd junctions in one’s history, but 
suddenly through the flesh opening to new sense they become conjoined in a new depth of the 
moment in which the temporal distinctions are overcome. In this way, we see how time folds 
back and intertwines with earlier moments that come to be “side by side” or joined through 
juxtaposition like places on interlacing helixes of DNA. The in-between of human and machine 
opens as these disparate times open to each other; there is a transformation in who the person is 
or has become and the machine now functions in a different existential context. 




This is the more hopeful and constructive side of this interplace/intertime between human 
and machine. In this paper, I have not discussed how there can also be a betweenness that opens 
where disparate desires to dominate coalesce with the greater possibilities for power and 
violation offered by the machine. A desire to control citizens that has a long past can unleash a 
terrible space of fear between humans and between humans and their governments with the 
addition of electronic and computer-driven surveillance methods. Perhaps, a person’s past 
already riddled with periods of abuse and pain leaving them more indifferent to others can mesh 
with the cold, grinding gears of the machine to augment a life of indifference to other beings as a 
destructive in-between of cyborg existence. This, of course, is probably the more common fate of 
our dawning cyborg life, woven into a technological world where we only know ourselves as 
identified by the power we harness, driven by a hurried pace of machine-facilitated mass 
production, seeing everything as possibly reengineered to serve our productive will and drive for 
consumption, where the appeal to the caring, responsive human is made difficult within clanging 
rhythms of destructive inter-being. Yet, there are cyborg possibilities that could not only 
augment our practical capacities, but in doing so, may summon us to deepened humanity. Like 





1 For example, the Clark’s nutcracker is a bird that stores thousands of pine seeds in 
approximately two thousand caches in its surround before winter and can remember where these 
seeds are stored with amazing accuracy. It remembers in an immediate bodily sense since the 
features of its habitat are read perceptually as distinctive places arrayed around it, having a 
distinct place by being woven into the fabric of its project of surviving the harsh winter. The 
caches are almost extensions of its own body. Similarly, human beings live in an environment 
with myriad places arrayed around them that have a felt, bodily significance in the trajectory of 
being able to proceed with their projects. Their similar relationship to the surround opens up a 
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“between” of humans and these birds in how they inhabit their world together. For a discussion 
of this and other examples, see Mazis, Humans 24-28. 
  
2
 “The Stiftung of a point of time can be transmitted to the others without ‘continuity,’ without 
‘conservation,’ without fictitious ‘support’ in the psyche the moment that one understands time 
as chiasm” (Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible, 267). 
 
3
 In people with normal hearing, the conducted sound from the eardrum and the three tiny bones 
of the inner ear is further transmitted through the fluid of the cochlea which in turn perturbs the 
15,000 cell-sized hairs located in the cochlea. Each of these hairs connects to a nerve ending that 
sends sound messages to the brain. The implant simulates the action of the hairs with a limited 
number of nerve endings by using electrodes to stimulate the neurons. A microphone picks up 
sound waves, attached to the implant by a magnet, makes them into an electrical current sent 
down to a computer processor down at the waist, which turns them into bits of data, and then 
sends them by a wire through the skin to computer chips in the implant and fires electrodes (in 
Chorost’s case only sixteen) to stimulate the neurons. In Chorost’s chronicle of his first four 
years with this computer implant in his skull, his thinking about the relationship of humans, 
animals and machines undergoes profound changes. 
 
4
 For thinking about machines in this way, see especially chapter three in Mazis, Humans, 
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